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COMMENT
COUGH UP THE MONEY: A PRESCRIPTION FOR
REGULATING RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME OUT
OF U.S. HEALTH CARE
It's wonderful that the Iron Curtain is gone . . . but it was a
shield for the West. Now we'ye opened the gates, and this is very
dangerous for the world. America is getting Russian criminals. .
• . They'll steal everything.... Nobody will have the resources
to stop them. You people in the West don't know our mafia yet;
you will, you will.
-Boris Uvarov, Chief Serious Crimes Investigator for the
Russian Prosecutor-General'
Groups with the ability to coerce- the most significant asset of
organized crime- have long found a ready market for their serv-




With the end of the Cold War, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) was forced to find a new battle, and to reassign the tremendous
number of agents who had concentrated on U.S.-Soviet relations for
over forty years. Their mission turned to a domestic conflict, health
1. Shoshanah V. Asnis, Controlling the Russian Mafia: Russian Legal Confu-
sion And U.S. Jurisdictional Power-Play, 11 CONN J. INT'L L. 299, 307 (1996).
2. PETER REUTER, RACKETEERING IN LEGITIMATE INDUSTRIES: A STUDY IN
THE ECONOMICS OF INTIMIDATION iii (1987). Reuter's study was proposed by the
head of the New York Organized Crime Task Force, which subsequently provided
him access to its voluminous data collection of past and ongoing investigations.
See id.
3. See Charles H. Reistacher & Jack Y. Chorowsky, End of Cold War Frees
FBI To Target Health Care Fraud And Abuse, HEALTHSPAN, June 1993, at 3.
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care fraud, that was costing the nation over $100 billion annually.
4
These agents currently work in conjunction with other special agents
from the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as over 100
federal prosecutors, in health care fraud task forces across the country. 5
Although the Cold War is over, the U.S. is fighting a Russian invasion
on a domestic front. It is well documented that the Russian mafia has
entered the United States since the break-up of the Soviet Union. 6 Play-
ing on an already existent immigrant structure, these exported criminals
have brought their ability to engineer government scams to America.
One of the more prevalent and imaginative activities of Russian organ-
ized crime is its entry into the field of health care fraud.7 The Russian
mafia's involvement in this lucrative area becomes even more threaten-
ing due to the belief that it may be working with other international
criminal organizations, 8 as well as sending business back to Russia to
ensure that its claim over the criminal element that currently exists in
Eastern Europe is preserved. 9
Louis Freeh, Director of the FBI, stated that drug dealers have
changed the focus of their activities from drugs to health care fraud be-
cause the business is so lucrative and "the risks of being caught and im-
prisoned are less."' 0 Therefore, if health care fraud has become a law
4. See Eric Hollreiser, Pa. Blue Shield Hires Ex-Cop To Fight Fraud, PHIL.
Bus. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at 3B (citing reports from the General Accounting Office).
The cost of health care fraud has-risen from $70 billion in 1992. See Reistacher &
Chorowsky, supra note 3, at 3.
5. See Reistacher & Chorowsky, supra note 3, at 3.
6. See generally Asnis, supra note 1.
7. See Hollreiser, supra note 4, at 3B. The Director of Special Investigations
for Pennsylvania Blue Shield Insurance Company stated that the Russian Mafia has
demonstrated an affinity for this creative organized criminal practice. See id.
8. In Claire Sterling's THIEVES' WORLD, the author refers to the relationship
between international organized crime groups as the "pax mafiosa" or the "peace
among mobs." See CLAIRE STERLING, THIEVES' WORLD 117-168 (1994).
9. For example, one commentator states, "If you're a Russian shopowner (in
U.S.], you don't go to the local mafia boss to complain anymore, you just call Rus-
sia and ask them to send a hitman." See id. at 165.
10. FBI Director Freeh stated that the 1500 backlogged health care fraud cases
in the FBI could be handled by doubling the size of its 249 agent investigative
teams, the approximate cost of which is $37.6 million. John S. Day, Medicare
Fraud Costing Billions, FBI Chief Says, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22, 1995, at
1. One of the key reasons that it is difficult to catch these physicians is because the
government is currently allowing for full insurance reimbursement for "generally"
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enforcement priority, and organized crime is involved, then why don't
we fight it with the tools that Congress has specifically created to com-
bat the problem since the rise of organized crime this century? This
question is half answered in that the government is using laws like the
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute to prose-
cute this problem. But it appears that because prosecution is an after-
the-fact solution, there must be some way to stop this fraud before it
starts.
Preventing this fraud would be nearly impossible. However, because
we have had other legitimate businesses which have been infiltrated by
-organized crime, it would make sense to examine those businesses and
compare their regulation patterns to those used in the health care profes-
sion. This Comment will examine the licensing procedures for the appli-
cants of these other regulated industries, specifically the casino business
in Nevada and the trash cartage profession in New Jersey, and attempt to
establish if these techniques may be effective to regulate organized
crime out of the health care field. To achieve this, this Comment will
explore three areas: (1) a comparison of the professions themselves, (2)
a comparison of the licensing procedures utilized in each profession, and
(3) the common thread that would make a certain regulatory practice
effective in the fight to disassociate the health care field from organized
crime.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Russian Organized Crime
1. Origins of Organized Crime In the Former Soviet Union
Although "organized crime" has become a criminal catch phrase of
the Twentieth Century, its existence has been present for centuries.1 '
supervised procedures. See id. "General supervision means the procedure is fur-
nished under the physician's overall direction and control, but physician presence is
not required during the performance of the procedure." See 42 C.F.R.
§ 410.32(b)(3)(i)(1997). These procedures include diagnostic psychological testing,
colorectal cancer screenings, mammography, electrocardiagrams, ultrasound pro-
cedures, magnetic resonance imaging, as well as various forms of x-rays. See id. at
(b)(2)(i-iv). This leaves open the possibility of forming criminal commercial enti-
ties that could complete these screenings and then submit the bills to Medicare.
11. See Patricia Rawlinson, Russian Organized Crime: A Brief History, 2
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There are few cultures in which the factors traditionally associated with
organized crime could have been better implemented than in the former
Soviet Union. In the early 1800s, Russia ignored the tentative wave of
liberal democracy that was taking place in Western Europe and re-
mained affixed to a feudal system which forced the majority of the
population to remain as serfs. 12 Although the dissatisfaction with this
system led to multiple reforms in the latter part of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, which eventually culminated in the Bolshevick Revolution in 1917,
there was a more subtle effect of this centralization of power. 3 The em-
phasis on the autocracy weakened regional efforts to create policy to the
point where attempts at criminal enforcement became passive and arbi-
trary.1
4
This system, inherited by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and the Bolshevicks,
became an important foundation for the autocratic structure they wished
to establish. Lenin stated, "We shall not allow the police to be re-
established."' 5 In its place, Lenin created the feared enforcement arm of
the government called the Komityet Gosudarstuyennoj Byezopas, more
commonly known as the KGB. The corruption that had been the stalwart
of the tsarist regimes had become essential to the success of Lenin's
Soviet vision.' 6 The leaders of the movement allowed this to occur so
that initial economic confidence would lead to the political success of
this new ideology. 7 However, what began as minimal dealings with
corrupt entities in the "black market" led to institutionalized reliance,
TRANSNAT'L ORG. CRIME 29, 32-36 (1996). The accepted components of organ-
ized crime include: (1) monetary base for community activity; (2) a definitive hier-
archical structure; (3) a clear division of labor; (4) a strict understanding of laws of
the subculture; and (5) a strict punishment for insubordination. See id.
12. See id. at 33..
13. See id. Some of these reforms include the "[e]mancipation of Serfs in 1861
and judicial reforms of 1864 which introduced ... open hearings, the election of
judges and the use ofjury systems for criminal cases." Id.
14. See id. In 1905, one Russian attorney stated that "[t]he law is not honored
in Russia! Before the eyes of everyone, openly, the law is violated, lawlessness
flourishes, and this embarrasses nobody, no-one thinks about it." Id.
15. Id. at 34. The organization that Lenin created was referred to as the Cheka,
or the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage.
This group was the predecessor of the Komityet Gosudarstuyennoj Byezopasnosti
(KGB), and was considered to be more violent than any previous tsarist force. See
id.
16. See Rawlinson, supra note 11, at 35.
17. See id.
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arguably allowing for quasi-government sponsored criminal activity into
the latter half of this century.
Although the economic impact of organized criminal activity in Rus-
sia was not officially recognized until 1990, its presence was inherent in
the seemingly legitimate structures of government.' 8 The criminal origin
began in the feudal societies and subsequently evolved to the point
where, although activity such as the armed banditry of government
agencies (banks and post offices) was viewed as criminal by the state,
those who participated in it were considered to be "fighters for justice,
perhaps even leaders of liberation."' 9 However, this criminal activity
underwent another transformation when the perpetrators of the crimes
began using their resources as a means of support for the Communist
movement. 20 In fact, not only was the capital that they generated an ef-
fective means by which to strengthen their position, but their knowledge
of how "bandits" may take advantage of the system allowed them to
quickly eradicate all other rising factions whose activity would be a
threat to their underlying goal of government2
Over the next seventy years, communism was to be the rule of law.
However, in so much as history repeats itself, a more tightly knit yet
unpronounced criminal group began to establish itself in the Soviet Un-
ion. This group rejected the beliefs of Communism and formed a secret
subculture based on a strict adherence to a criminal code of the "vory v
zakone," or "thieves-in-law." 22 It was essential for this underworld to
function as its own system so that it could protect itself from the fierce
henchmen of Lenin and Joseph Stalin.23 The risk associated with this
existence reestablished the heroic status of criminals in the eyes of the
ordinary Russian citizen.
2 4
18. See id. at 36. The 1928 Russian Criminal Code defined banditism as
"groups having the intention to attack government or public enterprises, institu-
tions, organizations or private individuals, and in like manner, the participants in
such gangs and the carrying out of such attacks." Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 36-37. The illegal forms of raising Communist party monies
came from armed robberies, bank and mail heists, and expropriation of private
property. See id. One of the leaders of these thieving bands was a bandit by the
name of Koba, otherwise known as Joseph Stalin. See id.
21. See Rawlinson, supra note 11, at 37.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 38.
24. See id. at 39.
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While this system of organized criminal activity was growing, the
Soviet economy became increasingly more unstable. The labor force
began to depend on schemes that included fraudulent practices, corrup-
tion of public officials, and connections to coercive middlemen just to
meet stated quotas. 25 As Patricia Rawlinson points out:
'The truth is that the mass of the population does not look upon
theft from the state as real theft.' And yet the idea of stealing
from one another was unthinkable. The philosophy behind such
practices was based on a logical principle: the people are the
state, state-owned property belongs to them, so how can a man
steal from himself? But as demand continued to outweigh supply
the population had recourse to another source: the growing black
market.
26
This "unofficial economy" of the black market, often referred to as
the "shadow economy," employed many sales profiteers and foreign
currency dealers. 27 In fact, this practice became such an important part
of the legitimate Soviet economy that it is estimated that over fifty per-
cent of the country participated in it, and any attempt to discourage the
black market would force the economic collapse of the Soviet Union.28
Because of this fear and the continuing need for the capital it generated,
a direct alliance formed between government officials and the directors
of this Soviet subculture, whose relationship was referred to as the "ma-
fiya.,,29 Any realistic fear that uncorrupted law enforcement would try to
rescind these relationships became unwarranted after the legal reforms
of 1987, which allowed organized criminals to take advantage of pros-
perous legitimate businesses. 30 These laws lessened the breadth of.state
25. A typical scheme might involve a gang buying a product illegally from the
director of a state store, selling at a retail price, while the director of the store re-
ported this as a theft. See Robert Cullen, Comrades in Crime, PLAYBOY, Apr. 1994,
at 70, 72. This fraudulent activity materialized into an unofficial dialect among the
Russian people. The following terms are commonly used in discussing these prac-
tices: krugovaya poruka - institutionalized corruption between government offi-
cials; blat - having the right connections; and ochkovtiratel'stvo - pulling the wool
over someone's eyes. See Rawlinson, supra note 11, at 42.
26. Rawlinson, supra note 11, at 42.
27. See id. at 42. One official commented, "We were so accustomed to the
shadow economy that it was impossible to live a normal life without black market
goods and services." Id.
28. See id.
29. See Asnis, supra note 1, 303-04.
30. In the push for privatization during this period, the criminal enterprise was
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control, opening opportunities for private ownership and much needed
currency from foreign investments. With these new venues, the possi-
bilities for organized criminal activity were greatly enhanced.3'
Although Americans believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union was
a vindication for capitalism, it may have simply been the introduction of
a distorted market into a global economy, which has allowed organized
crime to pervade legitimate society.32 In fact, Rawlinson states that
"[o]rganized crime cannot operate or develop in a vacuum. Its develop-
ment is dependent initially on the environment in which it operates, until
it has reached a point at which it becomes a cause rather than [an] ef-
fect."33 These new market differences in the global economy provide
new challenges for crime to overcome. Once it has, we are left with
smarter criminals.
34
2. Structure of Russian Organized Crime
Although there is little known about the criminal structure of Russian
organized crime as compared to La Cosa Nostra (the Italian Mafia), re-
cent studies have developed a rough outline of who controls the
activity. 35 The Russian equivalent of a La Cosa Nostra "godfather," re-
ferred to as "vory v zakone," lacks much of the authority that exists in
the Italian system. The vories are considered to be professional crimi-
nals and are believed to have roots in the Stalin era of Soviet control.
36
able to enter into various joint ventures and gain access to international banks to
launder monies. See Rawlinson, supra note 11, at 46.
31. See Asnis, supra note 1, at 303. This is best exemplified in the fact that by
1992, the inability for purely legitimate businesses to compete in Russia led to the
privatization of over 80% of all business controlled by organized criminals. See id.
32. See Rawlinson, supra note 11, at 50-51.
33. Id.
34. One author has referred to these individuals as "supercapitalists" who have
the ability to examine a situation and discover how to "rape it successfully." Greg-
ory Katz, Russia's Under World Finds Fertile Ground In America, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 11, 1995 at IA.
35. "It admires and copies the Sicilian mafia as the highest standard of excel-
lence." See STERLING, supra note 8, at 96.
36. See New York State Organized Crime Task Force, New York State Com-
mission of Investigation & New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, An
Analysis of Russian tmigr Crime in the Tristate Region, 2 TRANSNAT'L ORG.
CRIME 177,197-98 (1996) [hereinafter Tristate Report]. It is estimated that a Mos-
cow-based working group of 10 to 15 of the over 600 "vory" in the former Soviet
Union govern the transnational activities. See id. Consistent with the Italian model,
19991
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Although the "vory" are the most entrenched of the organized criminal
syndicates, they are most likely not the most dangerous threat.37 How-
ever, regardless of the extent to which the "vory" are involved in current
transnational ventures, the combination of their enduring past and a bur-
geoning criminal element in search of tutelage will continue to make
them a threat to the United States.
The other two groups are referred to as the "young entrepreneurs" and
the "thieves in authority." The "young entrepreneurs" are often younger
criminals who have little experience in the Soviet system.3" Because of
this inexperience, their network of criminal contacts is limited to
"crimes of opportunity" and "get-rich-quick" schemes. 39 The final
group, the "thieves in authority," also referred to as "avtoritey," have a
more substantial base in Soviet history.40 These individuals have been in
existence since the early days of the Brezhnev era. 41 They are typically
well-educated former businessmen and government intelligence agents
who possess international connections. 42 These "gangster-bureaucrats"
are said to be found at the intersection of "crime, capitalism, and gov-
ernment in the former Soviet Union. 43 These individuals have both the
intellectual capacity and the contacts to run these elaborate international
schemes, and therefore, are probably the most dangerous to international
security.44
Although these descriptions may appear to be actual hierarchies, the
Russian mafia, with the exception of the "vory," is substantially differ-
this group is responsible for enforcing a definitive set of rules, primarily practiced
in the prison system, where so many of their numbers spent most of their lives. See
id.
37. See id. at 198. This view is based on the fact that the more noticeable
crimes currently occurring in the U.S and abroad involve international banking
schemes, computer crime and money laundering, which are crimes that are not part
of the limited portfolio of the vory. See id.
38. See James Finkenauer & Elin Waring, Russian Organized Crime in the
United States: Organized Crime or Crime that is Organized?, 2 TRANSNAT'L ORG.
CRIME 139, 147-49 (1996).
39. See Tristate Report, supra note 36, at 198-99.
40. See id. at 199.
41. Brezhnev was Secretary-General for the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982.
See ROBERT SERVICE, A HISTORY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY RUSSIA 379-428
(1998).
42. See Tristate Report, supra note 36, at 199.
43. Id.
44. See id.
1999] Russian Organized Crime in US. Health Care 639
ent from the Italian model. An overreaching control of international ac-
tivity is almost non-existent as the most successful groups are only re-
sponsible for one particular scheme.45 There is very little trust between
these groups, and the idea of loyalty is suspect, even with the obvious
cultural similarities. 46 These distinct groups utilize each other for spe-
cific criminal needs and, once the financial goal is attained, separate to
search out new contracts, whether they be from Russian or other organ-
ized criminals.47 This type of activity is foreign to our more common
understanding of organized crime in which the criminal acts exist to
support the structure.4 8 In the Russian model, the structure is venture-
oriented, relying on its structure to support the criminal activity.
49
3. The Russian Mob in the United States
In the late 1700s, the United States opened its doors to the people of
the world. Although this new land did not guarantee a better life for im-
migrants, it did promise that it would provide an opportunity for those
willing to take the chance. The U.S. has created its own ideology of suc-
cess, so often proclaimed as "the American Dream." This credo may in
fact be a license for criminal activity in that immigrants are expected to
use any means necessary to achieve that success.50 Since the mid-1900s,
New York has been the point of entry for over 200,000 Russian immi-
grants, and a haven for those Russian immigrants searching for this
dream.5" It is believed that for a significant number of these individuals,
a reliance on their customs of survival in Russia will result in criminal
45. See id. at 199-200.
46. See id.
47. See Tristate Report, supra note 36, at 200.
48. See id. at 200.
49. See id. This merely refers to the fact that the socioeconomic conditions in
Russia have created these criminal groups which represent different groups in soci-
ety. Therefore, these individuals utilize these skills to take advantage of certain
profit-making situations. The other mobs are different because the crime is con-
ceived before the participating individuals are aware they are involved. See id.
50. See LYDIA ROSNER, THE SOVIET WAY OF CRIME: BEATING THE SYSTEM IN
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S.A. 61-63 (1983).
51. See Katz, supra note 34, at IA; Cullen, supra note 25, at 70; see also Wil-
liam Kleinknecht, THE NEW ETHNIC MOBS: THE CHANGING FACE OF ORGANIZED
CRIME 275-76 (1996). Gerald Ford signed the Jackson-Vanik amendment requiring
the former Soviet Union to grant visas to Jews to receive trade benefits with the
U.S. See id. See generally Tristate Report, supra note 36.
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behavior in the United States.
52
Many of these immigrants eventually settled in Brooklyn, in Brighton
Beach which has become known as "Little Odessa By The Sea. 53 The
evolution of Russian criminal immigration over the past seven years can
be broken down into two distinct waves. The "first team," as they are
referred to, is comprised of violent blue-collar criminals who were an
extension of the mafia in Russia, conducting typical crimes associated
with organized criminals; 54 while the "second team," which has little
contact with the "first team," concentrates its criminal activity in the
area of white collar crime. 55 Although the two are quite distinctive, their
similarities include the need to exist within the support system of a Rus-
sian community, as well as the ability to take advantage of the compara-
tively liberal criminal laws in the United States.56
Lydia Rosner, who developed the first study on criminal activity by
Russian 6migrds in the United States, has further defined these groups
into "necessary criminals" and "system beaters. 57 The necessary crimi-
nals are those who fall into the sociological structures forced upon them
in the former Soviet Union and who merely partook in the "shadow
economy"; "system beaters" are those who have learned how to take
advantage of the bureaucracies that currently exist in the United States.
58
Thus, it is argued that this combination of an understanding of the U.S.
bureaucratic system, along with the Soviet survivalist mentality, estab-
lishes the necessary environment for the creation of organized crime.5 9
As it has been demonstrated, Russian 6migr~s, particularly the "sys-
tem beaters," have developed a knack for taking advantage of govern-
ment programs. In fact, it is quite common for a Russian dmigrd to apply
for all state benefits, including welfare, food stamps, and housing assis-
52. See ROSNER, supra note 50, at 85 (demonstrating that immigrants deter-
mine what laws to break by how ineffective police officers enforce the law).
53. See Katz, supra note 34, at IA.
54. See Asnis, supra note 1, at 307. These crimes include narcotics trafficking,
money laundering, extortion of dmigrd merchants, and prostitution. See id.
55. See id. These typically include some type of financial fraud scheme. See id.
56. See id. at 308. See also Cullen, supra note 25, at 30. Cullen states that the
Russian immigrants believe the United States to be a "candy store without a pro-
prieter." Id.
57. See ROSNER, supra note 50, at 103-04.
58. See Finkenauer & Waring, supra note 38, at 146.
59. See id.
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tance, whether or not he is entitled to such benefits. 60 The most likely
explanation for this is that under the Soviet system, these individuals
had an expectation of governmental funding.61 When asked if she
thought that the U.S. government recognized this practice as illegal, one
6migr6 said: "Not really. The government knows that people are doing
this and they see it as a way to help people get themselves set up and
that eventually they wouldn't need it. So they don't really do anything
about it. They have to know about it. They allow it." 62 One of the main
reasons why these 6migr6s feel so free to take these chances is their
minimal fear of, or respect for, U.S. law enforcement. 6' The jurispru-
dence system in the United States caters to the schemes of the Russian
6migris because instead of facing the Soviet standard of "guilty unless
proven innocent," they can easily take advantage of the laws that guar-
antee certain rights to the accused. 64
Richard Valdemar, an investigator with the Los Angeles County
Sheriffs Department equated the West Coast to "Disneyland" for Rus-
sian organized criminal groups. 65 Structured criminal groups in Califor-
nia have become active in the areas of extortion, prostitution, drug traf-
ficking, and medical and insurance fraud.66 There is also documented
evidence that there is substantial cooperation between these groups and
those more established groups on the East Coast. 67 Although their exis-
tence is recognized, it has proven difficult to apprehend these criminals.
Not only has their experience in Russia taught them how to find weak-
nesses in government systems so as to run these successful scams, but
their lingering espionage skills from the cooperation of former KGB
60. See ROSNER, supra note 50, at Introduction, xv.
61. See id. at 102, 106. It is estimated that 50% of the Russian immigrants
involved in criminal activity that are living in Brighton Beach are accepting some
illegal entitlement from the government. See id.
62. Id. "Since enforcement is neither constant or consistent, she says that she
assumes the government has made a policy decision to allow it." Id.
63. See id. at 89. See also Kleinknecht, supra note 51, at 272. One Brooklyn
detective stated "I had one guy in here for questioning whose leg looked like a
pretzel...It was broken in a dozen places in a Soviet prison. He showed it off and
said 'you're going to do worse to me." Id.
64. See ROSNER, supra note 50, at 89.
65. See K.L. Billingsley, Russian Crime Families Reap "Golden West" in
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members makes them difficult to track.68
Even with the existence of strict immigration laws, known criminals
can still communicate with and direct current Russian 6migrds which
confirms a belief that these individuals have strong ties to the criminal
leadership of the former Soviet Union. 69 As stated earlier, many of the
members of these criminal groups live amongst their fellow countrymen
in immigrant communities. However, because of the closeness of the
relationships and the interdependence among those in these communi-
ties, the criminals have the most success victimizing fellow immigrants
first.70 Taking advantage of these people has two immediate benefits.
First, many victims will not report these crimes out of fear of
retaliation.7' Second, there is an inherent distrust of the government for
anyone from the former Soviet state, making it more difficult to receive
cooperation from them in prosecutions.72 With estimates of the Russian
immigrant population increasing by almost 200,000 in California over
the next two years, this state has become increasingly attractive to
would be criminals.
73
4. Effect of Russian Organized Crime in the United States
Russian criminal activity, whether in the former Soviet Union or in
the United States, has been successful due to its ability to adapt to new
environments.74 There seems to be two reasons for this ability. In a very
short time, these criminals have not only successfully diversified them-
selves into many of the stereotypical elements of criminal activity, such
as prostitution and money laundering, but have also added new schemes
including gas tax and health care fraud, which have proven even more
lucrative.75 As this ability to effectively manipulate the government has
been demonstrated by certain individuals within the Soviet culture,
6
68. See id. See also Katz, supra note 34, at IA.
69. See Bill Wallace, The Next Red Menace, S.F. CHRON, Mar. 19, 1995, at 3.
70. See id.
71. See Asnis, supra note 1, at 308.
72. See Wallace, supra note 69, at 3.
73. Id.
74. Patricia Rawlinson has referred to this pension for adaptability as "the
Chameleon Syndrome". See Rawlinson, supra note 11, at 29.
75. See Bruce Frankel, Ruthless Russian "Mafiya", USA TODAY, Sept. 14,
1995, at IA.
76. See STERLING, supra note 8, at 90 demonstrating that there are fifty words
in the Russian language which mean to steal, all of which are used by the mafia.
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coupled with the intelligence to create and carry out these new and
elaborate schemes,77 the Russian mafia may have established a "faultless
money-making" machine. 8
The second reason for the rapid growth of the Russian mafia is its
non-traditional development in the United States. Because the Soviet
dmigr~s understood how to manipulate a government, there was no need
for them to follow the pattern of other burgeoning crime families who
focused on extorting money out of their own immigrant
neighborhoods. 79 This is not to say that the Russians did not prey on
other 6migr~s,8° but rather the combination of the substantial income
from the simultaneous manipulation of both the 6migr~s and the gov-
ernment, produced enough exposure for them to be recognized by other
more established criminal groups.
The best example of this cooperation with other criminal syndicates is
the gas tax scheme. This practice allowed Russian mafia agents to re-
distribute gas quantities between bogus companies without paying the
substantial taxes that were required for interstate transport.8 ' The final
sale was then sold to unsuspecting dealers at a discount, complete with
forged tax receipts. 82 This lucrative activity soon caught the attention of
John Gotti, former head of the infamous Gambino family of the Italian
mafia.8 3 As the Italians reached out to this potential criminal partner, the
Russians were able to expand their activity with added security and the
custody of corrupted officials provided by their new Italian connection. 4
Developing these types of relationships with the well established
Italian families has led to new opportunities for working capital and
protection for Russian mafia driven schemes. This has also given them
an unofficial induction into what Claire Sterling refers to as "the plane-
77. See id. at 162. Jim Moody of the FBI stated that "John Gotti doesn't have
college-educated people and trained military officers like the Russian Mafia does."
Id.
78. Id. at 163.
79. See Kleinknecht, supra note 51, at 277.
80. See id.
81. See STERLING, supra note 8, at 163.
82. See id. at 163.
83. See id. at 160. Gotti said of this scheme, "I gotta do it right now! Right
now I gotta do it." Id.
84. See id. at 162. In fact, NBC news broadcaster Tom Brokaw commented on
this relationship stating that "[i]t gives a new meaning to detente." Id.
1999]
644 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:631
tary crime club., 85 Although this "club" has no definitive pre-requisites,
the amount of money that the Russians' variety of activities has accu-
mulated for them would place them among the top members.
A substantial portion of these monies, the aggregate product of all
schemes set in the United States, are reportedly being sent back to Rus-
sia.86 This in turn expands funding to the previously discussed shadow
economy, thereby further dissolving legitimate law enforcement in the
new Russia. With continued mafia activity abroad, both U.S. security
and economic interests are placed in jeopardy. Therefore, it is crucial
that the broad parameters of these schemes be narrowed in order to stop
these monies from strengthening the criminal element both at home and
abroad.
B. USE OF LICENSING TO CURB MAFIA ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
1. The General Need for Licensing
The licensing of professional activities exists to ensure that incompe-
tent and unethical practitioners are not allowed to harm or defraud the
clients with whom they work.87 This procedure exists for the benefit of
both the public and the profession itself. The more important of the two,
the public welfare purpose, stems from the state's police power. 8s
In his book, Of Foxes and Henhouses, Stanley Gross outlines three
reasons for the licensing model under the public welfare. The first con-
centrates on the inability of the consumer to determine the competency
of the practitioner.8 9 He blames this mostly on the fact that due to the
evolution of urban society, information about a person's reputation is
not effectively disseminated. 90 A second reason cited by Gross is the
third party/epidemic effect, where the harmful effects of the negligent
85. See id. at 164.
86. See Frankel, supra note 75, at IA. The Canadian police have found evi-
dence that one billion dollars a month is moving from Russia to North America and
then back again. See id.
87. See STANLEY J. GROSS, OF FOXES AND HENHOUSES: LICENSING AND THE
HEALTH PROFESSIONS 16 (1984).
88. See id. The state has the right to enforce laws, as well as argue supervisory
powers when an activity places citizens in immediate peril. See id.
89. See id. at 17.
90. See id.
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practitioner may find their way into society as a whole. 9' The third rea-
son focuses on the idea that because people tend to be overly optimistic
in their personal evaluations of their own actions, it is better to adhere to
a societal standard.92
Gross conveys two reasons for the professional purposes of licensing.
The first is the need for a positive public perception of a particular in-
dustry.93 The second is the basic right that the individual practitioners
have to establish the expertise necessary to work in the particular indus-
try.94 In fact, an attorney from the California Medical Association justi-
fied medical licenses under the idea of career security when he said that
"[i]t seems to me in the professions where many years of education and
experience is [sic] demanded before one may freely practice, that the
group is justly entitled to governmental protection against encroach-
ment by the untrained and the unskilled.
'" 95
Inherent in both the concern for public welfare and the rights of the
professional, is the need to keep "con artists" and "scammers" out of
these legitimate businesses. The existence of these individuals goes be-
yond questionable qualifications, to the point where they utilize various
means of violence and coercion to invade the more lucrative components
of the profession. This is most often seen, in the regulated mafia activity
within these legitimate operations. Two of the more famous examples of
corruption by these mob affiliations are the casino and cartage indus-
tries.
2. Licensing of Gambling Casinos
In the mid-1940s, Bugsey Seigel, a recognized member of Italian or-
ganized crime, established enough invested capital to build the first
major hotel-casino in Las Vegas.96 Investors in Seigel's enterprise were
paid handsomely for their start-up funds, which created a new source of
revenue for the mafia apart from earnings skimmed through racketeering
91. See id. at 17-18.
92. See GROSS, supra note 87, at 19.
93. See id. at 20. Gross discusses this point in quoting the California Senate
Committee on Business and Professions in their witness comment on social work:
"Social work has certain ... reasons for needing regulation. These are: to establish
a true and dignified public image of social work to increase public confidence and
understanding of social work." Id.
94. See id. at 20.
95. Id.
96. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 63-64.
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activity.97 Because the earnings were in cash, the money was merely
diverted to the proper source, and the only income reported for tax pur-
poses was working capital and limited profit.98
In the beginning of the 1970s, Nevada changed its laws so as to allow
corporate ownership of casinos.99 This change in the law greatly affected
the organized crime agenda because the state agencies would be estab-
lishing a foundation for legitimate businesses to enter into this profes-
sion.100 The most effective way to accomplish this was to create a regu-
latory approval system for everyone through an application for gaming
licenses.
The ultimate burden to meet before receiving a gaming license is that
the applicant must be a suitable person "having due consideration for the
proper protection of the public health, safety, morals, good order and
general welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Nevada .. .."..0' The
general qualifications for the license include that: (1) the person is of
good character; (2) the person's prior activities do not pose a threat to
the general public; (3) the individual has adequate business competence;
and (4) the applicant's financial disclosures are from a competent
source.10 2 In addition, those who take on this role are bound by a code of
"good moral character," and consequently, will be investigated for com-
pliance with the law.103 As general as this authority is to grant a license,
the Gaming Control Board of Nevada has a similarly broad ability to
97. See id. at 64.
98. See id. at 64-65.
99. See id. at 64.
100. See id.
101. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463-170 (1994).
102. See id. The actual application for a state license requires more specific
information. Other requests for a "nonrestricted license"- any business with more
than fifteen slot machines - may include reports on family background, military
service, marital status, occupational and residential history. See JEROME SKOLNICK,
HOUSE OF CARDS 175 (1988).
103. The applicant must also include fingerprint cards, a formal affidavit stating
that all of the information listed is truthful, bank statements or any bank informa-
tion requested by the board, and fees to cover the investigation. See SKOLNICK,
supra note 102, at 174-78. If the investigation exceeds the allotted fees, the appli-
cant is required to pay the difference. See id. Of all of the various forms to be filed,
the most important is the "Invested Capital Questionnaire," which asks for a com-
plete disclosure of assets and liabilities. See id. Although this report may show the
possibility of criminality, it is traditionally used as an indication of the applicant's
ability to handle such a business. See id.
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revoke a license "for any cause deemed reasonable by the board."',0 4
The question here, as is pointed out by Jerome Skolnick in his book,
House of Cards, is that those who have demonstrated an affinity for the
gaming industry have probably learned how to run a successful casino as
a former gambler. 0 5 This poses the problem that much of casino activ-
ity, before regulation, was corrupt, and these new casino operators may
very well promote their corrupt foundational practices at these
casinos.10 6 This idea of regulation is also a means by which to more eas-
ily exercise law enforcement and auditing, but even with their existence,
the introduction of informal employee behavior makes monitoring
problematic.10 7 Consequently, the regulations rely heavily on the li-
censing procedure. As Skolnick points out, it is the moral character of
the applicants as the operators of the casinos that are key to the control
structure.1
08
Following an exhaustive financial investigation,' 0 9 a hearing process
begins. The first stage, if necessary, is the investigative hearing, the in-
tention of which is to discuss specific matters of the application." 0 The
next stage is the public body hearings. These proceedings often establish
whether the applicant is clearly suitable (no connection to organized
crime) or clearly unsuitable (substantial connection to organized
crime).'" Although a criminal record will not necessarily require denial
of an application, a reputation as an "organized crime figure" may make
104. Id. at 175.
105. See id. at 176.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 178.
108. See SKOLNICK, supra note 102, at 178.
109. The investigative process begins after the paperwork has been submitted by
the applicant. See id. at 178. Copies of this information are disseminated to various
agencies who in turn verify the appropriate portion of the information listed on th.
application, either through government records or the five personal references that
are required to be listed. See id. Financial investigation also includes the invest-
ment funds available to the applicant to determine whether any of the funds are
possibly corrupt or if that investor may have a determinative voice in the selection
of vendor services for items like liquor and credit. See id. at 181. Skolnick demon-
strates a bank loan scheme example where a $200,000 bank loan is repaid by an
organized crime investment to the applicant's bank account and transfer of title of
$100,000 in real estate. See id. at 178-81.
110. See id. at 178-82.
111. See id.
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continued efforts futile.12
Although certain policy considerations are considered during the li-
censing process,"13 the composition of the licensing commission is key
to the success of the review process. The approved gaming commission
must consist of those who have been citizens of the State of Nevada for
at least six months." 4 The chairman must have at least five years of"re-
sponsible administrative experience in public or business administration
or possess broad management skills.""15 Another member of the board
must be a certified public accountant or have comprehensive knowledge
of public finance, gaming, or economics. 16 The responsibilities of these
individuals includes: (1) inspection of premises where gaming will be
conducted; (2) inspection of all gaming equipment and supplies; and (3)
seizure and reproduction [in the presence of the investigatee] of all pa-
pers and documents pertaining to the gross income of the establishment
which is subject to criminal prosecution." 7
After all material has been received, the board makes its recommen-
dation to the commission, and the commission has the option of re-
manding for further investigation, granting the license, denying the li-
cense, or granting a probationary license."18 If an individual is approved
for a license, and then a complaint is filed, the applicant/casino goes
through a hearing/review process by the commission."l 9 If the license is
rejected, the petitioner may appeal to the commission for acceptance on
the record.
20
However, there may be a due process violation because the Gaming
112. See id.
113. As is prescribed in the licensing statute, the overarching policy considera-
tions of gaming as important to the State of Nevada include: (1) economic vitality;
(2) growth of industry dependent on public trust; (3) maintenance of this trust es-
tablished only by strict regulation; and (4) no absolute right to a license. See NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.0129 (1997).
114. See id. § 463.040.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id. § 463.140. An individual's application for licensing may be re-
jected due to a prior criminal conviction, failure to disclose interest in gaming es-
tablishments, and other failed disclosures that would reflect on the veracity of the
applicant. See id. § 463.15 1.
118. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.220.
119. See id. §463.3133.
120. See id. §§ 463.315-.318. Here, the petitioner is required to pay all neces-
sary fees. See id.
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Commission has both the licensing and adjudicative functions., 21 Under
a plan suggested by Skolnick, the commission would not sit as judge,
rather, a board of experts would make decisions based on the record
established by the commission. 22 Thus, the major problem with the li-
censing of gambling is the depth to which a commission can explore an
applicant's connection to organized crime and the scope of authority it
can exercise.
Nevada's approach to gambling appears to be an extremist regulatory
response because the overseeing agencies include the Casino Control
Commission and the Division of Gaming Enforcement in the Attorney
General's Office.' 23 Although the gaming commission has been rela-
tively successful in its attempts to remove the organized crime compo-
nent from the casino business,1 24 it seems that there is an inherent dis-
crepancy in the licensing procedure. Although the Board can deny a li-
cense for any reason, having that same body try to adjudicate a single
license is an inherent denial of the separation of powers on which the
government was based. 25 The Skolnick model, which recommends for a
121. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it has
been established that a term of employment may be considered a property right that
cannot be taken away absent the due process of the law. See generally Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The gambling industry faced this dilemma
when Frank Rosenthal, a professional gambler with possible connections to organ-
ized crime, petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court under the theory that an applicant
for a gaming license in Nevada who has had a work permit for a number of years in
that same industry does have a property interest that should be protected by due
process. See SKOLNICK, supra note 102, at 223. The court did not allow this argu-
ment holding that licensing was under the commission's discretion. See id. at 227.
122. See SKOLNICK, supra note 102, at 228.
123. Critics argue that overregulation might result from the initial fear of too
many banks getting involved in the financing of institutions that were inevitably
tied to organized crime. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 77. Historical research illus-
trates the validity of this fear at the time, and, subsequently, that it may now be
invalid. See id.
124. This goal was first publicly stated when Governor Brendan Byrne's com-
mented, while signing the bill approving casino operation in New Jersey, "Organ-
ized crime, keep out of here." Id. at 77.
125. "There is little question that a doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of the national government is well es-
tablished in our constitutional jurisprudence .... It is derived not from any specific
language in the Constitution, but from the general constitutional framework."
PAUL G. KAUPER & FRANCIS X. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 342-343 (5th ed. 1980). This applies to gambling in that the decision to
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board of experts to review these decisions, provides an engaging com-
pliment to the current procedure.
3. Licensing of the Cartage Industry
The garbage collection industry has had an extensive tradition of
customer allocation schemes that have resulted in numerous restraint of
trade suits.' 26 In the New York metropolitan area these agreements have
been established by union leaders who are often recognized members of
the Italian mafia. 127 The private garbage industry consists of regional
customers who are often bought and sold by various garbage carters. 2 s
This process is referred to as "customer allocation."'129 Customers con-
tract directly with the carting service. 130 These contracts are generally
not written, but as long as the trash gets picked up, a typical routine is
understood.' 31 Although these carters usually work regionally, they may
establish agreements with companies that have varied sites.,32 However,
the contracts are not exclusive because if a company moves to another
region, its contract is up for grabs.
33
This agreement between carters allows one company to sell its interest
for a profit while the other carter can raise cartage prices on those indi-
viduals serviced. Because this practice was not regulated, there was no
price enforcement. The only enforcement that existed was that of or-
ganized crime which coerced other carters to either limit their customer
regions or honor the agreements giving customers to other carters.
1 34
grant the license is vested in the same body who decides whether they acted un-
fairly in not granting it. See SKOLNICK, supra note 102, at 228.
126. See Peter Reuter, The Cartage Industry In New York, 18 CRIME & JUST
149, 158 (1993). Although these suits have often been filed, New Jersey courts
usually uphold even the most restrictive agreements of these associations. See id.
127. See id. at 149.
128. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 10.
129. See id. Reuter cites that direct evidence of this customer allocation was
introduced in hearings before the Department of Consumer Affairs in New York
City. See id.
130. See id. at 10.
131. See The Cartage Industry In New York, supra note 126, at 153. Reuter
points out that this arrangement is most common in the market segment of restau-
rants and commercial stores because these establishments deal directly with the
carters. See id.
132. See id. at 153. An example of this would be a construction company.
133. See id. at 156.
134. See id. (citing that unions became the instruments of the mafia "by picket-
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Organized crime syndicates then took a percentage of this money as
their income.
However, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the state of New Jersey'
35
not only began licensing the carters by the Board of Public Utilities, but
also required individually approved rate schedules. 136 Each applicant had
to submit data that would allow the particular carter to receive the "al-
lowed rate of return," or a specific tariff that his net income may not
exceed based on the number of customers he is carrying. 137 Although
this type of regulation was in practice in 1970, it reflected actual prices,
which forced labor to file higher tariffs in order to bypass the new appli-
cations when these more restrictive conditions were imposed. 138 The
result of this practice was fewer applications and less complaints from
customers for overcharging of registered tariffs. 139 Because it is so sim-
ple for carters to overstate the number of customers they are carrying, it
is nearly impossible to ascertain the actual amounts they are charging.
40
The only licensing prerequisites that exist are the "good character"
standard and the data required for the extensive financial application.'
14
Unfortunately, the statutory licensing procedures are liberally granted by
the New Jersey State legislature. 42 Furthermore, although there have
been some related adjudications, the general application of the licensing
procedures upholds the authority of municipal regulation. "
43
Although this practice still continues, the Board of Public Utilities,
the official licensing body, has been given ample authority in license
ing customers of firms that broke the agreement").
135. See id. at 188. Reuter points out that the New Jersey system was much
more elaborate than the one set up in New York. See id.
136. See The Cartage Industry In New York, supra note 126, at 188. A survey of
of 41 carters in Bergen County demonstrated that the 12% rate base received in tax
revenue was only 4% of actual earnings. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 84.
137. See The Cartage Industry In New York, supra note 126, at 188.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See REUTER, supra note 2, at vi.
141. See id. at 185.
142. See N.J. STATS. ANN. § 40:52-1 (West 1998). The term "liberally" is cited
in the text because Reuter indicates that the licensers made almost no effort to ver-
ify financial statements. See The Cartage Industry In New York, supra note 126, at
187.
143. See Marangi Bros. v. Board of Com'rs of Village of Ridgewood, 33 N.J.
Super 294, 110 A.2d 131 (N.J. 1955).
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denial. 44 But, it is generally held that these policies have neither in-
duced competition or eliminated the organized crime element. 45 Peter
Reuter demonstrates that the occasional prosecutions that are instituted
by the agency, in all likelihood, do more to enhance than to remedy the
problem because customer fear of retaliation leads to an underreporting
of suspected bidrigging.146 He advocates one system, albeit intrusive and
potentially expensive, that may be useful to curb this problem. The es-
sence of his plan is the establishment of a regional district authority
which would monitor contract arrangements and bid negotiations so that
carting activity would be regulated to operate at a minimum price.147 Its
assessment would be qualified by a separate engineering committee that
would validate the cost structure of the proposed bids.1
48
Although this plan does not establish a means by which to remove
organized crime from the process, it attempts to reinvent portions of the
system which would make the activity more cumbersome and less lu-
crative to be involved in. 149 Under the old system, racketeered unions
would be responsible for regulating these customer allocations. How-
ever, under Reuter's proposed plan, any attempt at rigging bids to get-
contracts in regulated areas would fail.150 A final distraction for racket-
eers is that realistic rates would be established by the number of moni-
tored carters, making it more difficult to introduce inflated tariffs. 5 ' By
144. See The Cartage Industry In New York, supra note 126, at 189.
145. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 80-84. In fact, Reuter argues that this "con-
spiracy" is still ongoing because: (1) the practice has become habitual; (2) custom-
ers have accepted the behavior due to lack of successful complaints; and (3) new
carters are intimidated by the possible aggressive retaliation of others by their entry
into the field. See id.
146. See id. at 85. Reuter points out that "occasional prosecution and investiga-
tion usually prominently covered by the press, has ... added to the reputational
asset of the carters. With the customers being passive, regulators have not been
able to prevent the various kinds of fraud that undermines price regulation, at least
not without large-scale and intrusive inspection efforts." Id.
147. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 87-89.
148. See id. at 85-88. According to Reuter, the engineering review panel would
need to examine data from solid waste collection markets, the number of house-
holds serviced, employee size, various distinguishing characteristics, the number of
houses and hills in a given market, union wages, union benefits, the cost of fuel,
insurance mandates, and the cost of disposal. See id. at 94.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 95.
151. See id.
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curbing the large profit margins by racketeers and their organized crimi-
nal cohorts, their time investment in this corrupt activity would offset
the cost-benefit margin forcing their eventual exodus from this arena.
III. PRIOR LAW
A. Health Care Fraud and the Government's Case
Abuse under the Medicare Carrier's Manual has been defined as:
Incidents or practices, which although not considered fraudulent
acts, may directly or indirectly cause financial losses to the
Medicare/Medicaid programs or to beneficiaries/recipients.
Abuse is those practices wherein providers, physicians, or other
suppliers of health care goods or services operate in a manner
inconsistent with accepted sound fiscal, business or medical
practices in such a way that these practices result in an unneces-
sary financial loss to the Medicare or Medicaid programs and are
not within the concept of reasonable and necessary services as
defined in the Medicare or Medicaid laws.1
52
This sets out the general idea behind the federal and corresponding
state law against health care fraud in the United States. 153 The statutes
further criminalize practices that include improper coding by providers
who are paid by a fee-for-service arrangement; and "kickback" pro-
grams which include rebates, discounts and profit-sharing activities, as
well as self-referrals. 54 These federal regulations are supplemented by
the general criminal prohibitions of mail fraud and racketeering, as they
are utilized in the larger health care fraud scheme. 5 Working with ap-
proximately ninety percent federal funding, these practices are combated
by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Office of the Inspector General
of the Department of Health and Human Services, the FBI, as well as
152. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 638 n.l (1995).
153. Although there will be no explicit discussion of state law in this Comment,
there are slight variances in state legislation, yet all carry the necessary means by
which to prosecute health care fraud. See id. at 669-71.
154. See id. at 638.
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (Principals), id. § 286 (Conspiracy to Defraud the
Government with Respect to Claims), id. § 287 (False, Fictitious or Fraudulent
Claims), id. at 371 (Conspiracy), id. § 1001 (Statements of Entities, Generally), id.
§ 1341 (Frauds and Swindles), id. § 1962 (Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act).
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state run agencies. 1
56
1. False Claims
The most common type of fraud, and the most relevant to this discus-
sion, is the abuse associated with overbilling and false claims. 57 A
"claim" is "an application for payments for items and services under
'Medicare, Medicaid, or a state health care program'."'' 58 While the ma-
jority of these claims refer to the billing for services never conducted,
some cases refer to improper use of the billing codes, where a physician
will bill for a more expensive procedure than he actually performed. 59
Civil remedies are available under the Medicare and Medicaid False
Claims Statute. 60 Under this act, a plaintiff may receive up to $2000 per
violation, as well as double claim assessments for federally funded state
programs.' 6' These actions are guided by a standard where the doctor
"knows or should have known" that the procedure was not properly rec-
onciled with the code number provided. 162 The problem for both crimi-
nal and civil defendants is that the Supreme Court has found that there is
no double jeopardy protection from civil suits in health care fraud sce-
narios; 163 and ultimately, criminal conviction of a physician registered in
156. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 639.
157. A General Accounting Office survey analyzed 279 cases between 1984 and
1985 and found that 89% of cases involved submission of false claims. See id. at
640 n. 1.
158. Id. at 640 n.5, (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. 1320a-7a(i)(2)(1994)). Fraudulent uses
of a claim include: (1) improper filing; (2) failure to disclose knowledge of the
event that caused the need for medical attention to receive payment; (3) submission
of claims when actor was not a physician; or (4) false certification of the necessity
of certain services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(a). The filing of a fraudulent claim
can be a felony and is punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine up to
$25,000. See id.
159. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 641 (citing United States v. Larm,
824 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1078(1988)). An allergist was
convicted on seventeen counts of Medicaid fraud for using a code which referred to
"evaluation and or treatment of same illness" versus the proper code which read
"minimal service ... not necessarily requiring the presence of a physician." Id.
160. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(a)(1)(A),(B)(1994); FURROW ET AL., supra note
152, at 641.
161. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 641.
162. See Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act, 57 Fed.
Reg. 3298, 3324 (1992).
163. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989).
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the Medicare/Medicaid program will disqualify his participation in the
program for five years) 64
2. Fraudulent Referrals
Another important issue is fraudulent referrals. This process occurs
where a physician willfully solicits and/or receives payment for his di-
rect or indirect involvement in issuing patients into a Medicaid or Medi-
care fraud scheme. 65 Although this referral system may be questionable
if physicians get a percentage of the payment from a particular test, the
courts have generally given a limited interpretation of remuneration that
would require an express arrangement where there is an "offering or
paying something of value with the intention of causing the recipient to
make referrals because of the influence of that remuneration over the
recipient's reason or judgment."' 166 Specific exemptions cited by Con-




Fraudulent referrals also include self-referrals, whereby a physician
refers patients to an entity in which he holds a fiduciary interest. The
Stark Amendment, also known as "the anti-kickback statute," prohibits
this practice on the federal level. 169 Furthermore, physicians who enter
these schemes so as to circumvent the self-referral statutes can be held
civilly liable up to $100,000.170 The rule against self-referrals does not
apply to physicians in the same practice, 171 and services furnished by
164. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 643 n.19. Under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 42
U.S.C. 1320-7(a)(1), "[c]onviction is defined broadly to include nolo contendre
pleas or entrance into diversion programs." Id.
165. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b). There are three rationales for this
rule: (1) the overtesting of healthy patients; (2) the cost to the government; and (3)
the fact that the services will be chosen by physician not on what is most conven-
ient for the individual, but by what is most lucrative to the provider. See FURROW
ET AL., supra note 152, at 645-46.
166. FuRRow ET AL., supra note 152, at 647 (citing [1992-1 Transfer Binder]
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH), 39,566 at 27,747 (Sept. 18, 1991)).
167. These exemptions will be recognized only if these discounted savings are
passed on to the government. See id. at 647.
168. See id.
169. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A)(1994).
170. See id. § 1395nn(g)(4).
171. See id. § 1395nn(b)(2)(A)(i)(ii). Group practices include partnerships, a
professional corporation, a faculty practice plan, or other group where there is a
shared working area, services and costs are distributed with regard to a predeter-
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prepaid plans, such as HMOs (health maintenance organizations) or
CMPs (competitive medical plans).
7 2
These statutes have provided a wealth of criminal laws which a gov-
ernment attorney can utilize for prosecution. Although the previously
discussed penalties are substantial and quite foreboding, these criminal
prosecutions do not solely rely on. the existing health care fraud
statutes 73 to prosecute these crimes. Rather, prosecutors are incorporat-
ing more established statutes which include "conspiracy"'' 74 elements,
namely money-laundering'7 and the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organization (RICO) laws.176 These laws allow for more efficient prose-
cution because: (1) multiple defendants can be tried under one criminal
theory; and (2) the prosecutor is able to obtain traditional injunctive
penalties, such as asset forfeiture. 77 Conspiracy-based laws are only one
aspect of the arsenal that the Department of Justice plans to unleash on
what has become a law enforcement priority for the 1990s.
78
mined agreement, and there is no direct correlation between remuneration and
number of referrals. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 658.
172. See id. at 1395nn(b)(3).
173. Existing health care fraud legislation includes: 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994)
(making it a crime to submit false claims to a department of the United States); 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1)(1994) (making these fraudulent claims specific to Medi-
care and Medicaid); and the Stark Amendment of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1989, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V 1993), along with numerous state
laws.
174. See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940). In criminal law, a
conspiracy is defined as an agreement to do an unlawful act. See id.
175. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994). Often cited in narcotics cases, mon-
eylaundering is an act that allows the criminal to disguise illicit funds as legitimate
gains. See also PAMELA Bucy, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS
228 (West 1998).
176. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). "Passed in 1970 as part of a major
crime fighting bill, RICO's stated goal is to protect the public from 'parties who
conduct organizations affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of criminal
activity."' Bucy, supra note 175, at 116.
177. See Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes By Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 589, 619-30 (1996).
178. See Bureau of National Affairs, Investigations, Prosecutions Up, Recover-
ies Topple $274 Million, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Sept. 10, 1997, at 577. The
Department of Justice refers to health care fraud as "the crime of the nineties." Id.
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B. Smushkevich Case
One infamous health care fraud scheme was run by suspected Russian
organized criminals David and Michael Smushkevich in Southern Cali-
fornia. 179 This scheme resulted in a successful criminal prosecution of
the two brothers who were the heads of what has been documented as
the single largest health care fraud in the history of the United States,
netting over $1 billion. 80 David, a medical doctor in the Soviet Union,
immigrated into the U.S. in 1975, and worked his way up to become a
well-paid president of Shared Cardiovascular Services, a company
which provided hospitals with diagnostic equipment.' 8 ' His brother, Mi-
chael, arrived in the U.S. just four years after David, in 1979. Michael
began perfecting the pattern of the "telemarketing scam" soon after that,
renting equipment for medical exams from his brother. 8 2 Collectively,
these expertise thus set the stage for the billion dollar scam.
The scheme began with the-brothers recruiting the help of licensed
and unlicensed physicians to give credence to the Medicare and Medi-
caid documents that they file. 183 The brothers utilized a telemarketing-
style approach to establish a patient base'8 4 with a telephone "pitch,"
including the promise of free-checkups and costs which would be cov-
ered by insurance. 8 5 When individuals ventured to the mobile labs
where the doctors were located, the check-up would turn into a litany of
tests that were neither promised nor necessary for the patients.1s The
tests included echocardiograms (EKGs) and expensive cancer related
treatments. 8 7 In some cases, such tests were often not performed at all,
179. See generally Susan Moffat, Brothers Face Charges of $1 Billion Fraud
Crime: Two High Living Immigrants From the Former Soviet Union Go On Trial,
Accused of Running the Biggest Health Care Scam In US. History, L.A. TIMES,




183. See STERLING, supra note 8, at 164.
184. See Moffat, supra note 179, at BI.
185. See STERLING, supra note 8, at 164. Curiously enough, this particular scam
did not include Russian immigrants, rather it focused on people in the community
that were either susceptible to health concerns or interested in preventative medi-
cine. See id.
186. See Moffat, supra note 179, at 2.
187. See id. at 3.
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but charges for treatment still showed up in billing records.' 88
With hundreds of doctors on the payroll, the Smushkeviches created
over five hundred false specialty labs with different post office boxes.'
89
These labs were then able to appear as referrals from the original doc-
tors. 90 This practice spread out the extensive revenues' 9' that the scam
was producing and validated the unnecessary tests that the patients re-
ceived, thereby making the government none the wiser. 92 In conjunction
with these practices, the Smushkeviches also sold discounted receivables
to unknowing collection agencies, many of whom were never paid.
93
However, ignorance is not always bliss in that this scheme alone cost the
State of California over twice what it spent for indigent medical care in
the previous year.' 94 Major insurance carriers which felt the effects of
this fraud included Blue Cross, Aetna Life, and the Defense Depart-
ment's Civilian Health and Medical Program, which were hit with a
combined $155 million in fraudulent claims. 95
Unfortunately for the Smushkeviches, one of the cold-call victims was
Dr. William Marr, a medical doctor and health insurance company con-
sultant. 196 Out of curiosity, Marr ventured to the clinic and submitted to
numerous unnecessary and improperly conducted tests.197 His insurance
claim forms returned a bill for $7,500 fraudulently citing "diabetes,
heart disease, high blood pressure, a stroke, cancer, allergic conditions,
[and] viral infections. ' 98 Marr suffered from none of these conditions.'99
This information led to a six year investigation that has achieved sev-
188. See id.
189. Telephone interview with Mark Hardiman, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, Central District of California, (Feb. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Hardiman interview].
Mr. Hardiman was the lead prosecutor on the Smushkevich case.
190. See id.
191. It is estimated that the scam brought in between $8,000 and $10,000 per
person in billings to over 1,400 insurance companies. See generally Moffat, supra
note 179.
192. See Hardiman interview, supra note 189.
193. See Bureau of National Affairs, US. District Court Sentences Rolling Lab
Fraud Principals, HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1690.
194. See Moffat, supra note 179, at B 1.
195. See Miles Corwin & Henry Weinstein, Doctor Gets 20 Years for Health
Insurance Scam Fraud, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1996, at BI.
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eral successful prosecutions. For his part, Michael was sentenced to
twenty-one years and ten months in prison, as well as $2.7 million in
fines and $41 million in restitution.200 But the prosecutions have not
stopped there. The U.S. Attorney of the Central District of California,
Nora Manella, has sought and received convictions of other participating
doctors20' and lab directors.20 2 One commentator noted that the Califor-
nia Medical Board continues to examine the activities of over 150 doc-
tors who may have participated in this scheme.
20 3
C. Physician Licensing
Although fraud in the health care profession appears to be a recent
phenomenon, throughout history, states have undertaken the duty to es-
tablish guidelines by which applicant-physicians should be judged for
licensure. In 1889, the Supreme Court validated the authority of the
states to set certain standards controlling the practice of medicine within
their borders. 20 4 Generally, license requirements for physicians entering
the field will consist of a required educational curriculum, satisfactory
performance on board examinations, and a review of personal history.2 5
The licensing provision under California state law 20 6 requires that any
individual, association of individuals or corporation, who desires a li-
200. See Corwin & Weinstein, supra note 195, at BI.
201. See id. at B8. A supervising physician was successfully prosecuted under
Medicare Fraud statute and Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization laws.
His sentence was for 20 years and $41 million in restitution. See id.
202. See United States v. Yan Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 106 (9th Cir. 1989). Manella
explained that this "sentence shows that those doctors who abuse the trust of their
patients for personal financial gain do so at their peril." Corwin & Weinstein, supra
note 195, at B1.
203. See HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP., supra note 193, at 1689.
204. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 127 (1889).
205. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 58.
After the states enacted licensure requirements for physicians in the
1870's and 1880's, the American Medical Association began a cam-
paign to establish standards for medical education and to assure that
only graduates of medical schools meeting those standards were al-
lowed to sit for state licensing examinations . . . the AMA gained,
and has retained, control over accreditation of medical schools and,
thus, over the major prerequisite for state licensure examinations.
Id.
206. Because this Comment is examining a California case, it will lay out the
specific requirements for physician licensure under California state law. Although
other states' licensing programs are comparable, the reader is not to assume they
are the same.
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cense for a clinic must provide the following information to the state
department.2 °7 First, the applicant must establish the reputable character
of the individuals applying for licensure.2 °s Secondly, if the applicant is
a corporation, it must divulge the names and addresses of each officer,
director and stockholder owning ten percent or more of stock. 20 9 Third,
the name and address of the clinic must be issued, as well as an affidavit
of compliance to the Business and Professions Code of California.
210
Fourth, the applicant must provide the name, address and professional
experience of the licentiate responsible for the administrative proceed-
ings of the applicant. 1
Finally, the State requires the applicant to provide: a specific list of
the treatments to be administered; a description of the location of the
practice including facilities, equipment, and necessary appliances for
successful operation of the clinic; as well as sufficient operational data
to determine the class of the clinic and the initial license fee to be
charged.212 The Code establishes that if these elements are complied
with, and if the officer chooses to examine the facilities and finds them
to be acceptable, then a license can be issued.213 However, most physi-
cians will require more than a state license to practice medicine. In the
absence of a clinic or office, they will need a hospital. To receive these
privileges, physicians must go through a credentialing process. 214
Because these licensing factors are specific to both the state and hos-
pital regulations, in 1920, the Supreme Court found that states could not
impose their regulations upon physicians engaged in federal work; and
207. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1212 (West 1997).
208. See id. § 1212(a).
209. See id. § 1212(c).
210. See id. § 1212(e).
211. See id. § 1212.
212. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1212(g)-(h).
213. See id. § 1353.
214. To understand this, the following is the necessary review at the George-
town University Hospital Center in Washington, D.C. Initially, the Hospital sends
out an application which covers most of what was covered in the California law,
except for the inclusion of insurance liability information. Document obtained Nov.
11, 1997 from Office of the General Counsel for Georgetown University Hospital.
This process follows with an extensive verification procedure which includes let-
ters of support from the appropriate division chief, department chair, and faculty
administrator. See id. When these licensing verifications have been received, the
applicant goes to an executive staff for final approval. See Georgetown University
Hospital's "Credentialing For New Appointments." See id.
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likewise, because no federal licensing format existed, there was no need
for a particular state license for the physicians. 2t5 But, due to the crea-
tion of Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s, twenty-five percent of all
federal health care funds went to state support of these programs,
thereby giving the federal government a vested interest in, and a need to
more closely scrutinize, state practices.216
Due to the fact that peer review analysts have established that fear of
a lawsuit is the single biggest deterrent to peer review, Congress drafted
the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organization
Program (PRO), granting immunity for participating physicians. 217 This
program exists as a means by which the federal government can ensure
the safety of the beneficiaries, as well as control the costs of
Medicare.2 1  PROs have developed into police organizations that ensure
that patient services are not being undercut so as to allow hospitals to
make more profit from the Medicare reimbursements. 21 9 As of 1994,
PROs, based on a system of competitive bids, could become for-profit
institutions which were given enhanced sanction and payment denial
authority in line with their responsibilities. 220 A study from this same
year illustrates that there were forty-two PROs in fifty-three PRO state-
wide areas.221 The majority of the surrounding groups are made up of
twenty percent physicians from that geographical practice area or are
otherwise composed of ten percent of physicians in the area with the
remainder made up of those from the larger state community,222 and at
215. See Kathleen L. Blaner, Physician, Heal Thyself- Because the Cure, The
Health Care Quality Improvement Act May Be Worse Than The Disease, 37 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1073, 1087 (1988) (citing Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920)).
216. See id.
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1) (1997).
218. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 86. The PRO was preceded by the
Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO), which focused on the busi-
ness of medicine assuring that questionable reimbursement tactics were not prac-
ticed. See id.
219. See id. at 87. These practices include "premature discharge of patients" and
"underservice of hospitalized patients." Id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 87 n.10.
222. See id. (citing HHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE UTILIZATION
AND QUALITY CONTROL PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION (PRO) PROGRAM, AN
EXPLANATION OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 3 (1989)); see also 42 C.F.R. §
462.102 (1985).
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least one customer representative. 223 The remaining members of the
PROs are typically made up of insurance companies who purportedly
have the necessary number of physicians on staff to carry out the review
functions.224
Although the role of the PRO was initially to review individual cases
to make determinations based on indications of inadequate care, their
role is changing.225 Instead of individual record review, under the Health
Care Quality Improvement Initiative (HCQII), the federal government
will focus more on medical care trends through large data sets.226
However, there are credible arguments demonstrating weaknesses in
the PRO system. Based on the new data sets, the PROs have extensive
files on patients and doctors so as to identify problems for further
study. 227 At least one author states that by reporting all information, in-
cluding incorrect or misinformed data, this system may significantly
affect a doctor's reputation and therefore his ability to practice medi-
cine.228 In effect, such treatment may be a violation of the physicians'
Constitutional right to equal protection. 229 The concept of equal protec-
tion establishes that the government only acts legitimately when its be-
havior affects all similarly situated people.23° Under the current model of
the PRO, acceptable state practice may vary. Therefore, a physician's
actions in one jurisdiction may be sufficient grounds for termination of
his license, while the license of a physician in another state, who acted
in the same manner, may not be threatened.23'
223. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 152, at 87. This customer representative is
mandatory under 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c)-2(c)(3).
224. See id.
225. See id. at 88.
226. This review of health care trends is not as random nor as thorough as indi-
vidual record examinations as it focuses on trends as opposed to individual activity.
The current procedures under the HCQII are as much as 250% slower than the
manual approach. See id. at 88-89.
227. See id.
228. See Blaner, supra note 215, at 1099-100.
229. The Equal Protection Clause is guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment,
and states that the United States shall not "deny any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § I.
230. See id.
231. See Blaner, supra note 215, at 1100. Blaner argues that an ancillary reper-
cussion of this procedure may be an acknowledgment by the medical community
that these procedures are quite harsh, thereby unfairly tainting the reputation of the
doctors. Id. Therefore, the state will be less likely to take disciplinary procedures
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The author also cites the possible due process claim that may arise.
She contends that the mere existence of this public report may infringe
on a physician's ability to reestablish faith in his credentials if the find-
ings are proven to be erroneous.232 For example, if an individual at-
tempted to gain license in another state, he would have no right to due
process regarding that licensure because he did not have standing as a
physician in that particular community. Therefore, he could not claim a
hearing on his application even if the computer records were originally
false, as long as the peer review organization could establish a viable
reason to deny licensure.
233
Another complaint about the current status of peer review is that the
PRO creates a "procedural inertia. 234 This term comes from the multi-
ple procedures that are currently available to challenge payment denials:
re-petitioning the PRO, administrative appeals, and judicial review.
235
Given the varied medical diagnoses which may allow for these appeals,
the PRO program tends to offer minimal intervention.236 The interven-
tion that is offered, however, emphasizes correction. 237 The most popular
intervention programs include education and deterrence, allowing for
sanctions only after all other means of rehabilitation have been ex-
hausted.238 Professor Timothy Stoltzfus Jost of Ohio State University
even in cases that require investigation for fear of false allegations. See id.
232. See id. at 1106. The Due Process Clause is guaranteed in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and states that the United States shall not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
Blaner argues that even if a physician is convicted of the criminal act, Congress
should make expungement available to the physician if he can prove that this be-
havior is not likely to occur again. See Blaner, supra note 215, at 1106-07.
233. See Blaner, supra note 215, at 1108-09.
234. See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Policing Cost Containment: The Medicare Peer
Review Organization Program, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 483, 508 (1991).
"Procedural inertia" refers to the aggregate effect of the complicated procedures
that affect cost containment in health care. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 506.
238. See id. at 509. Jost states that:
[slanction cases consume considerable resources, for which the PRO
is not wholly compensated. A sanction recommendation that is not
ultimately upheld can also cost the PRO dearly in terms of its credi-
bility and support in the physician community. Absent conviction
that a sanction is absolutely necessary, the PRO is unlikely to take
on this expenditure of resources.
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cites two consequences that flow from this practice. First, corrective
action is often confidential, while the second is that corrective action
focuses on individual effect, as opposed to the far-reaching impact a
highly publicized fraud case would have on the physician community.
239
The current licensing procedures for physicians are comprehensive
because the state licensing board and the hospital verification process
significantly validate the physician's skills and character. The govern-
ment has a vested interest in monitoring physician activity. PROs may
be a good tool to weed out any corrupt or incompetent physicians. How-
ever, with the scenarios that have been cited here, it seems that although
the peer review process is necessary to fully understand the conditions
under which physicians work, the effectiveness of its role may need to
be reevaluated.
IV. ANALYSIS: CURRENT LICENSING PROCEDURES
Ultimately when dealing with the control of illegitimate activity in
legitimate business, you must balance three factors: costs to the gov-
ernment, costs to the parties involved, and the intrusiveness of the ac-
tion.240 Most often, entrance into these fields requires some sort of li-
censing procedure. Such procedures exist so as to maintain a certain
competency level of the particular practitioner, to curb the effects of
their incompetence on the general public, and to provide a societal stan-
dard to which future practitioners may aspire.
241
All three fields examined here- health care, casinos, and trash cartage-
require a general "good character" element in the competency standard.
Inherent in this "good character" requirement is that the applicant will
not engage in criminal activity under the guise of the license he may
receive. However, it is apparent that receipt of these licenses is by no
means a bar to individuals using them in a fraudulent manner. When
physicians use the licenses for, criminal behavior, they are most often
making money for themselves or for a limited number of individuals.
The cases in which whole countries are affected by these frauds are few
and far between. However, there is one type of criminal who is not only
using this license for himself, but for the advancement of a larger or-
ganization, generically referred to as "organized crime."
The Department of Justice realizes that health care fraud is an activity
239. See Jost, supra note 234, at 507.
240. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 83.
241. See GROSS, supra note 87, at 16.
Russian Organized Crime in US. Health Care
that is not only run by organized criminals, but by unethical physicians
as well.242 To remedy this, DOJ has established the reduction of health
care fraud as a national priority with an annual goal of 300 successful
prosecutions nationwide. 243 However, in reality, DOJ may take a number
of years to achieve such a goal. Therefore, the U.S. is currently facing
an organized crime syndicate who will feasibly earn billions of dollars
from this practice in the interim.244 Moreover, the likelihood of prosecu-
tion is so low that the potential profit is well worth the risks. The ques-
tion then becomes, "How do you stop their involvement?" A possible
avenue, along with DOJ's fierce prosecutorial effort, is an examination
of other legitimate industries that have been affected by the infiltration
of organized crime into their activity.
A. Comparison of Legitimate Businesses
The three businesses that are being examined here are hardly similar.
They run the gamut of what occurs outside your door before you wake
up in the morning (cartage industry), to where you take your children
after school (doctor's office), to where you may go to enjoy some fun
and excitement on a Saturday night (a casino). Although the businesses
themselves attract or recruit very different personalities, they nonethe-
less affect ordinary people every day. And if you are an organized crime
figure, these are the people that you want to affect. The average person
probably will not understand or expect a complicated fraud scheme, and
therefore, will not likely report such a scheme. But the reality is that
these schemes exist in all three of these industries and that is where the
similarity is the most dangerous.
The first business, health care, is made up of some of the most intelli-
gent and dedicated people in the world. These individuals have an ex-
242. See Bureau of National Affairs, Fraud Investigations, Prosecutions Up,
Recoveries Topple $274 million, DOJ Says, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Sept. 10,
1997, at 28. The most notable case cited in this article was the 1995 Illinois con-
viction of Caremark, Inc. for paying physician kickbacks for referrals. See id.
243. See id.
244. See Bureau of National Affairs, Medicare Claims Show $23 Billion Spent
"Improperly", IG Finds, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., June 18, 1997, at 382. The
article cites a Health and Human Services report indicating that the year 1996 alone
produced $23 billion in improper claims. See id. Based on this estimate, the amount
of expected income to be gained from fraudulent health care claims in the next few
years will remain in the billions while law enforcement develops efforts to combat
this fraud. See id.
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pertise from which everyone has benefited at least once in their lives.
The business itself attracts a higher quality of candidate due to the aca-
demic rigors and financial constraints imposed by the field of study.
However, because it is a field that requires such special skills and is an
area that all people experience as patients, it is a business that is
uniquely foreign, yet necessary to every person in the world.
Although those who practice medicine were once practically guaran-
teed a significant level of wealth, the introduction of managed care has
eroded this expectation. The insurance policies that were once liberal in
their payment structure have developed strict guidelines that limit reim-
bursement. 245 Therefore, some health care providers have turned to
health care fraud as a means by which to make up for the losses incurred
by minimal insurance payments. Others have used this system as a
means by which to defraud the government of monies to which the pro-
viders have no right.246 It has been this trend that has enraged both the
government and the public, because physicians, who are so immensely
trusted and revered in our society, would betray that trust and take ad-
vantage of a system that was established by and for the taxpayers of this
country.
Unlike health care, the casino industry does not necessarily recruit the
quality of candidates that the medical industry demands. However, ca-
sino operators must also have a certain degree of intelligence in their
day-to-day operations because they are responsible for dealings involv-
ing substantial cash transactions. 247 The ability to be successful in this
field eventually exposes individuals to a system of greed and corruption
that occurs when one becomes part of the gambling stereotype demon-
strated in popular culture. However, it has been demonstrated that this
stereotype is essentially valid. The casino industry in Nevada was ad-
mittedly created by a member of the Italian mafia, and one can infer that
the capital that went into it was "mafia money., 248 Although this busi-
ness has since been regulated, Skolnick points out that those who are
currently receiving the licenses must have had mentors who were taught
245. See Jost, supra note 234, at 488.
246. See generally Bucy, supra note 177.
247. See SKOLNICK, supra note 102, at 174.
248. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 63-64. Reuter draws this conclusion because
Bugsey Seigel was the operator of the first casino-hotel, The Flamingo, and he
maintained a close connection with the likes of famous East Coast Organized
Crime figures Lucky Luciano and Meyer Lansky. See id.
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under a corrupt system; 219 therefore, the casinos of the future will most
likely have elements of this corruption. Ironically, this seems to have
been taken for granted and accepted as the way of the establishment, and
any means at regulation are merely a thoughtful attempt on the part of
the government.
Finally, the cartage industry has not been infiltrated by federal insur-
ance policy, nor has it been glamorized into the pop-culture of America.
It has, however, offered another opportunity for organized crime to take
advantage of a legitimate business. It is the most unique of the three
industries because it does not seem to have begun as an illegitimate
business, as was the case in casinos, and there was no sudden injection
of the criminal element as in health care.250 It seems to have been a
gradual acceptance by the carters and their customers that has not yet
received substantial public complaint.25' Since the garbage collectors
pick up the trash in a timely manner and the tariffs are not excessive,
people are unlikely to complain.252 As the customers are not being ad-
versely affected or successfully hoodwinked, the call for regulation will
be minimal.
A layman's comparison to the public perception of these three indus-
tries demonstrates that it appears that the level of licensing or regulation
that we require is inherent in our feelings towards those individuals who
we perceive to be the practitioners of a profession. For example, the
sudden push for health care fraud reform may exist because of the intru-
sion that individuals feel they are receiving from a once trusted class of
society. Whereas in casino gambling or the cartage industry, people
have either accepted a criminal presence or have become ambivalent to
its potential existence.
B. Comparison of the Licensing Procedures
Surprisingly, for the assumed differences within these businesses,
their licensing procedures are quite similar. The first of these is the
"good character" clause that was mentioned in the state licensing codes
249. See SKOLNICK, supra note 102, at 177.
250. See § 2, Part B (3).
251. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 11. Although fear of racketeers may have led
to minimal public complaint, the low cost of the industry to begin with and the fact
that firms maintained the same level of corruption did not offer a need for custom-
ers to bring this practice to the attention of the authorities. See id.
252. See The Cartage Industry In New York, supra note 126, at 153.
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in the previous section. The "good character" requirement is important
to any of these businesses to prevent corrupt people from entering the
profession. The government regulates physician and casino gambling
licensing, by a series of inquiries into various references cited in the
applicant's background and financial application materials. 25 3 Although
the effectiveness of these licensing committee checks may be question-
able, they appear to be thorough in their analysis. In fact, in the case of
casino gambling, the licensing committee examines one's prior activity
in the profession, but there is an opportunity for a hearing on the record
if alicense is denied for this reason.
25 4
There are also other important considerations that develop when com-
paring the licensing boards of gambling and the payment structure of the
cartage industry to those of the health care field. In casinos, the board
has the duty to investigate the facilities to be used, whereas in the health
care licensing boards, it is only an option. This would have made a sub-
stantial difference in the Smushkevich case, because the inspecting indi-
viduals would have easily ascertained that there was no legitimate busi-
ness located there.255 This would not cover legitimate medical practices
that only focus on reimbursements of existing patients, but it would still
filter out the convoluted post office box schemes.
In the cartage industry, the payment plan allows for the individuals to
work within a tariff plan that provides a glass ceiling, allowing the car-
ters to buy and sell customers at a profit. Then, the new owners of the
contracts can make the money back by either charging the same rate or
higher, as long as it is under the tariff rate.25 6 This is not the way it
works in the health care industry. This income determination is different
from the procedure in medicine. Although the procedures the patient
will receive are within the doctor's discretion, the doctor has no author-
ity regarding how much the procedure should cost, or what percentage
of reimbursement he should receive. 7 When corrupt doctors base their
253. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1212 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 463-170 (1994).
254. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.220.
255. See Smushkevich discussion, supra § III, Part B.
256. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 11.
257. The insurance companies set reimbursement costs as industry standards.
See Jerome Lutsky, Is Your Physician Becoming A Teamster: The Rising Trend of
Physicians Joining Labor Unions In The Late 1990s, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
55, 57 (1999). Lower reimbursement rates mean cheaper premiums for the insured,
guaranteeing more patients for those physicians who accept that insurance carrier.
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services on the income they will receive, this practice can be equated to
the cartage income determination scheme.
V. COMMENT: THE COMMON THEME & THE NEED FOR AN
EXPERT PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION (EPRO)
The reason that these three businesses have not been compared before
is because, at first glance, they appear to be dissimilar, but this is, in
fact, untrue. Health care has not established itself as an industry that has
been continually taken advantage of by organized crime, but the evi-
dence demonstrates that it has at least once - to the tune of one billion
dollars.25 8 People have either accepted or are ambivalent towards the
existence of organized crime in these other fields, but they would rather
not accept this as a possibility in the health care profession. Although
people may feel more betrayed by these doctors, they have to realize
that the businesses are essentially the same in their capacity as server-
client relationships; and therefore, may be in need of a comparable
regulatory proposal.
Peter Reuter demonstrates that licensing becomes accepted under the
fact that practice becomes habitual, customers accept it as such, and, if
racketeering elements are present, the customers' fear of intimidation is
too great to bring matters to an enforcement organization.2' 9 Under
Skolnick's plan for casino gambling, he would establish a separate board
that would sit as a panel of experts to determine the extent to which an
individual may have prior connections to organized crime. 260 The exper-
tise of these individuals may identify business nuances of a person's
prior dealings which may lead to grounds for denial. 261 Reuter also of-
fers an oversight committee for the cartage industry. The role of this
committee would be to monitor contract arrangements and bid negotia-
tions so that carting activity would be regulated to operate at a minimum
price.262 This board would be responsible for a separate engineering
component that would validate the cost structure of the proposed bids by
individuals who have the expertise to make these decisions.
263
See id.
258. See Smushkevich discussion, supra § ili, Part B.
259. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 80.
260. See SKOLNICK, supra note 102, at 228.
261. See id.
262. See REUTER, supra note 2, at 85.
263. See id. at 86-87.
1999]
670 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:631
Currently, there is a comparable structure under the health care sys-
tem in the PRO.264 Although the PRO acts as a watchdog for health care
fraud, it has been demonstrated that as it exists in its current form, it
could be highly detrimental to physicians' reputations and subsequent
job opportunities. The current focus of the PRO exists as a corrective
body where "[i]ncapacitation and deterrence are secondary goals; [and]
punishment is of little importance.,, 265 Although problems do exist, the
immunized peer review process for the field of medicine is quite neces-
sary due to the nature of medicine. Therefore, the health care profession
should establish a state-sponsored system comparable to the PRO for the
licensing/credentialing of doctors.
This board would sit as an expert board to track the performance of
doctors at the recommendation of the PRO through various areas of de-
velopment. The information would be kept on a physician's permanent
record under a confidential assigned code and would not be kept on the
national database which has arguably given rise to equal protection and
due process issues.266 This expert peer review organization (EPRO)
would be comprised of licensed physicians of that state who would serve
rotating terms. It would arguably be more effective than the current
PRO, made up of mostly non-state licensed physicians and insurance
company employees. The mission of the EPRO would be to point out
questionable medical behavior, not to make insurance related cost deci-
sions.
The EPRO would be responsible for the practicing physicians in its
"region, 2 67 and any information regarding possible health care fraud
would be examined by the EPRO and, if believed to be fraud, the matter
would be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency. 268 Having
been provided with a legitimate allegation by respected members of a
medical community, these agencies would be able to establish a more
focused investigation which eludes the "procedural inertia" of the cur-
rent system. 269 This two-level review procedure and current investiga-
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1) (1991 & Supp 1998).
265. Jost, supra note 234, at 507.
266. See Blaner, supra note 215, at 1099-1102.
267. Regions may be established under the current system im which PROs are
run.
268. Although this body would be reviewing the records offered by the PRO, it
should also have the legal authority to perform both prepayment and retrospective
audits of claims.
269. See Jost, supra note 234, at 508.
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tion requirements by prosecutors would all but guarantee that due proc-
ess is served. In essence, this would allow doctors to police themselves,
and decide if their activity rises to the level of accidental billing error or
egregious misconduct. By establishing the latter, law enforcement bod-
ies will be heavily assisted in their prosecutorial charge.
This argument has several drawbacks. The two most obvious are the
extent to which it is possible to conduct these reviews on a regular basis,
and the common concern of self-regulating doctors protecting their
own.270 Regarding the first, a system could set certain career interval
evaluations for doctors beginning at initial licensure. Initially, the board
could run random patient inquiries or comparable measures that would
offer enough information to confirm the veracity the physician offered at
the initial licensing procedure. In order to maintain an appropriate board
pool, the state could offer incentive packages to experienced physicians.
The response to the second problem is a sociological one. It is not
incorrect to assume that there are unethical practitioners in the health
care field or that some physicians may be slow to engage in a substan-
tive colleague review, but one must also realize that one's initial dismay
to the health care fraud theory is that patient's trust their physician. That
trust is well-founded in most physicians because of their commitment to
their patients and to their field. Therefore one should not feel so hesitant
to put them in a position to measure the abilities of their colleagues as
that would be a great disservice to the standards that the profession
clearly holds today.
This proposal is an attempt to enhance the ability of doctors to remove
undesirable fraudsters out of health care, a system that some have used
to manipulate the lives of those individuals they swore to serve. Some
may argue that when corruption is involved, the field of health care is
really no different than the casino or cartage industry. Because proposed
boards of experts have been recommended by researchers on these top-
ics, it makes sense to establish a state-sponsored medical expert review
that has the immunity of the current PRO, but develops a relationship
with state and federal law enforcement in order to investigate probabili-
ties of health care fraud.
270. See id. Jost, although recognizing the hazards of self-regulation, argues that
too much has been made of it because there is anonymous review under insurance
company sponsored review. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When doctors become involved in fraudulent billing practices, it
sends a signal to America that criminal activity has the ability to infil-
trate almost any legitimate business. This has happened in California
where one scheme run by the Russian mafia has cost the government
one billion dollars.271 These types of health care fraud schemes are cur-
rently being perfected by the Russian mafia and are creating a tremen-
dous amount of revenue. This allows them to establish ties with other
international organized criminal syndicates and send capital back to the
criminal element in their homeland.272 If this activity continues, it could
contribute to a stronger international criminal establishment that would
threaten countries all over the world, including the United States. Al-
though the DOJ has recognized health care fraud prosecution as a na-
tional priority, 27 there still needs to be a regulatory approach to fraud.
The current regulatory approach to controlling fraud is a system of
licensing and monitoring member activity. Although this would seem to
be'conceptually effective, health care fraud continues to cost the United
States billions of dollars per year. By examining legitimate businesses
that organized crime has infiltrated, it is apparent that the most effective
"watchdog" is a technical review board intimately familiar with the
business. This precise knowledge of the subject's activity would assist
law enforcement in establishing the criminal component of the subject's
behavior. Because of the intricacies of medical procedures and the vari-
ous types of fraud that exist in the current system, it makes sense to es-
tablish an independent peer review board to evaluate physicians at par-
ticular stages in their career to determine if the activities in which they
are involved may necessitate criminal prosecution.
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